Bankers' strike

A responder to Krugman's post "Corporate cost of borrowing"writes:

Sigh. Yes, things are getting uglier. And, Paul, with all due respect and admiration, you have been missing the point by failing to analyze where we are in the crash-contraction-depression dynamic. You are running ahead to policy from, say, 1934.
We currently have a bankers’ strike (perhaps a tragic “I can’t help myself” strike, but still a management strike), which is acting exactly like a huge set of bank runs. The depression comes later; this is the contraction. Policy for the depression is not yet relevant; nor is a Keynes-Friedman debate.
Again, the FDR-era RFC physically replaced recalcitrant bank managers with Federal officers. Why is this not on the table? Couldn’t we cushion the contraction to some important degree by not choking off viable businesses access to capital? Remember, just-in-time finance was not in vogue in 1930. Our contraction is different. The bank strike kills good businesses; the demand recoil fully ices the deadly cake.
These bank managers–or their Federal agent replacements–simply have to write the “Yes We Can” lending memos or this is going to get much, much worse. Will some (some, a few, not “all” as some hysterics think) of the loans go bad? Of course, but so what? Compared to a further cascade of catastrophic failures it is simply not a big deal.
Economists fighting an irrelevant civil war while ignoring live policy options from history: Tell me how this is helping anything.
No offense I hope. And best of luck to all in these times.
–Jim in MN